by Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences, Stanford University in Stanford, Calif .
Written in English
|Statement||by Robert J. Aumann.|
|Series||Economics series / Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences, Stanford University, Technical report / Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences, Stanford University -- no. 415, Technical report (Stanford University. Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences) -- no. 415., Economics series (Stanford University. Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences)|
|The Physical Object|
|Pagination||24 p. :|
|Number of Pages||24|
An axiomatization of the consistent non-transferable utility value Sergiu Hart Center for the Study of Rationality, Department of Mathematics, and Department of Economics, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Feldman Building, Givat Ram, , Jerusalem, Israel. Aumann, Robert J, "An Axiomatization of the Non-transferable Utility Value," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(3), pages , : RePEc:ecm. Download PDF: Sorry, we are unable to provide the full text but you may find it at the following location(s): (external link)Author: Sergiu Hart. An axiomatization of the consistent non-transferable utility value Sergiu Hart 1 International Journal of Game Theory vol pages – () Cite this article.
An Axiomatization of the Nonsymmetric, Nontransferable Utility Value ANAT LEVY Tel Aviv University AND RICHARD P. MCLEAN Rutgers University In this paper, we study an axiomatic solution concept for NTU games, i.e., games in which utility is not necessarily transferable. An axiomatization of the core of cooperative games without side payment," (). An axiomatization of the non-transferable utility value,". A set of axioms is proposed, which uniquely characterize the Harsanyi  solution for nontransferable utility (NTU) games. These axioms appear formally identical to those of Aumann for the Shapely ("@l-transfer") NTU value; the difference lies in the range of the two solutions. Hart, S. (), An Axiomatization of the Consistent Non-Transferable Utility Value, Center for Rationality DP, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, mimeo. Google Scholar Hart, S. and Mas-Colell, A. (), Bargaining and value, Econometr –
An Axiomatization of the Non-Transferable Utility Value. Article. Shapley's Non-transferable Utility Value correspondence is characterized by a set of axioms, which combine the features of the. Sergiu Hart, "An Axiomatization of the Consistent Non-Transferable Utility Value," Discussion Paper Series dp, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem. Handle: RePEc:huj:dispap:dp Axiomatization of State-Dependent Expected Utility 79 Axiomatization of Expected Utility 80 Nonexpected Utility 82 Expected Utility with Two-Date Consumption 83 Notes 84 9 Risk Aversion 87 Introduction 87 Risk Aversion and Risk Neutrality 87 Risk Aversion and Concavity In the literature of economics the notion of utility differences has been much discussed in connection with the theory of measurement of utility. However, to the best of our knowledge, no adequate axiomatization for this difference notion has yet been given at a level of generality and precision comparable to the von Neumann and Morgenstern.